Abstract
Introduction
Encryption and signature are the basic cryptographic tools offered by public key cryptography for achieving confidentiality and authentication. Encryption is the process of transforming information (plain text) using an algorithm (cipher) to make it unreadable for those who do not have the secret key needed to decipher (decrypt) the information. Encryption can be done using the same secret key at the sender's and the receiver's side (private key encryption) or using different keys at both sides (public key encryption). Encryption guarantees confidentiality and privacy because the encrypted text can be read only by the intended recipient. Signature is the cryptographic technique where, before sending a message the sender A signs it with his private key. This ensures authentication because the recipient B knows * Work supported by Project No. CSE/05-06/076/DITX/CPAN on Protocols for Secure Communication and Computation sponsored by Department of Information Technology, Government of India that the message has been sent by A, and on the other hand, A cannot deny having sent the message to B.
The concept of signcryption originates from the various applications where both confidentiality and authentication are mandatory requirements. Signcryption, introduced by Zheng in 1997 [2] , is a cryptographic primitive that offers confidentiality and authentication simultaneously similar to the sign-then-encrypt technique, but with lesser computational complexity and lower communication cost. After Zheng's work a number of signcryption schemes were proposed [3] [10] [16] [11] [8] [7] [18] . The security notion for signcryption was first formally defined in 2002 by Baek et al. in [19] . This was similar to the notion of semantic security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack. The concept of identity-based cryptosystem was introduced by Shamir [14] in 1984. The distinguishing characteristic of identity-based cryptography is the ability to use any string as a public key. In particular, this string may be the email address, telephone number, or any publicly available parameter of an individual that is unique to that individual. An identity-based cryptosystem removes the need for senders to look up the receiver's public key before sending out an encrypted message. It provides a more convenient alternative to conventional public key infrastructure.
Group oriented cryptography was introduced by Desmedt in 1987 [6] . Elaborating on this concept, Desmedt and Frankel [4] proposed a (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on the RSA system [13] . In such a (t,n) threshold signature scheme, any t out of n signers in the group can collaboratively sign messages on behalf of the group by sharing the signing capability. This can be visualised in the situation where a company has n directors and if atleast t of them agree on a decision, then only that decision is finalised. An identity-based threshold signcryption incorporates the concept of threshold cryptosystem and an identity-based system along with the basic signcryption concept.
In 2004, Duan et al. [9] proposed an identity-based threshold signcryption scheme by combining the concepts of identity-based threshold signature and signcryption together. However, in Duan et al.'s scheme [9] , the master-key of the PKG is distributed to a number of other PKGs, which creates a bottleneck on the PKGs. In 2005, Peng and Li [12] proposed an identity-based threshold signcryption scheme based on Libert and Quisquater's identity-based signcryption scheme [15] . However, Peng and Li's scheme [12] does not provide the forward security i.e., anyone who obtains the sender's private key can recover the original message of a signcrypted text. In addition, both Duan et al.'s scheme [9] and Peng and Li's scheme [12] do not consider the formal security models and security proofs. Ma et al. [17] also proposed a threshold signcryption scheme using the bilinear pairings. However, Ma et al.'s scheme [17] is not identity-based. In May 2008, another scheme was proposed by Fagen Li and Yong Yu [1] . Although the scheme is more efficient ('as it requires one pairing less than the previous schemes), it is not secure against the insider attack. Our contribution: In this paper, we show that the threshold signcryption scheme of Fagen Li and Yong Yu [1] is vulnerable to the attack by the clerk (the semi trusted authority who combines the signatures of all the t players) by demonstrating an attack which shows that if the adversary corrupts the clerk then it is able to get the secret key of the system and hence a total break of the system is possible. Further, we propose a corrected version of their scheme and prove correctness and security (confidentiality and unforgeability) under the existing security model for signcryption.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we give the general framework of identity-based threshold signcryption schemes, and the security models for such schemes. Next, in Section 3, we review Fagen Li's threshold signcryption scheme [1] . We present the attack on this scheme in Section 4. In Section 5, we lay out the details of our fix to the original scheme. In Section 6, we present the analysis of the corrected scheme which describes the proof of unforgeability, where as proof for confidentiality is given in the full version of the paper. Section 7 concludes the discussion.
Preliminaries

Identity Based Threshold Signcryption
A generic identity-based threshold signcryption scheme with total n players and t threshold limit consists of the following five algorithms.
Setup:
Given a security parameter k, the private key generator (PKG) generates the system's public parameters params. Among the parameters produced by Setup is a key P pub that is made public. There is also a corresponding master key s that is kept secret. Extract: Given an identity ID, the PKG computes the corresponding private key S ID and transmits it to its owner in a secure way. Keydis: Given a private key S ID associated with an identity ID, the number of signcryption members n and a threshold parameter t, this algorithm generates n shares of S ID and provides each one to the signcryption members
It also generates a set of verification keys that can be used to check the validity of each shared private key. We denote the shared private keys and the matching verification keys by
Signcrypt: Give a message m , the private keys of t members {S i } i=1,...t in a sender group U A with identity ID A , a receiver's identity ID B , it outputs an identity-based (t, n) threshold signcryption σ on the message m. Designcrypt: Give a ciphertext σ, the private key of the receiver S IDB , the identity of the sender group ID A , it outputs the plain text m or ⊥ if σ is an invalid ciphertext between the group U A and the receiver.
We make the consistency constraint that if
Security Model for Identity-Based Threshold Signcryption (IDT SC)
The notion of semantic security of public key encryption was extended to identity-based signcryption scheme by Malone-Lee in [5] . This was later modified by Sherman et al. in [7] which incorporates indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext and identity attacks (IND-IDTSC-CCA2) and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks (EUF-IDTSC). We describe below the security models for confidentiality and unforgeability given in [8] , this is the strongest security notion for this problem.
Confidentiality :
A signcryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attack (IND-IDTSC-CCA2) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game. 1. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm and sends the system public parameters to the adversary A. 2. In the first phase, A makes polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles. Unforgeability: A signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EUF-IDTSC) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game. 1. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the master public and private keys params and msk respectively. C gives system public parameters params to A and keeps the master private key msk secret from A. 2. The adversary A makes polynomially bounded number of queries to the oracles as described in Step 2 of the confidentiality game. 3. A produces a signcrypted ciphertext σ and wins the game if the private key of sender identity ID A was not queried in the previous step and ⊥ is not returned by Designcrypt(σ, ID A , S B ) and σ is not the output of a previous query to the Signcrypt Oracle with ID A as sender.
Review of Fagen Li's Identity-Based
Threshold Signcryption Scheme
In this section, we present the identity-based threshold signcryption scheme as proposed by Fagen Li and Yu . The scheme involves four roles: the PKG, a trusted dealer, a sender group U A = {M 1, M 2 , . . . , M n }with identity ID A , and a receiver Bob with identity ID B . Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q (with G 1 additive and G 2 multiplicative), a generator P of G 1 , a bilinear mapê and construct a polynomial F (x) = S IDA + xF 1 + . . .
3) Broadcast y 0 =ê(S IDA , P ) and y j =ê(F j , P ) for j = 1, ..., t − 1.
4) Each M i then checks whether his share S i is valid by computingê(S
broadcasts an error and requests a valid one. Signcrypt: Let M 1,..., M t are the t members who want to cooperate to signcrypt a message m on behalf of the group
2) The clerk C( one among the t cooperating players) computes, 
Attack on the scheme
The scheme described above [1] is insecure from the point of view of attack by the clerk. The clerk is the semi trusted body in the scheme. He combines all the partial signatures to generate the final signature for the message. If the clerk becomes corrupt, the secret key of the system is revealed and hence a total break of the system occurs. We describe how the attack proceeds in this section.
we know that,
The clerk has the value of (R 2 , W, h), hence the secret key of A, S A is exposed as shown below:
The Improved Scheme
In this section, we propose an improved version of the Fagen Li's scheme, which we formally prove to be secure. The setup and key generation algorithms of our scheme are similar to that of Li's scheme. The modification has been made in the signcryption algorithm such that the system is secure against the clerk or any other insider. The details of the scheme are as follows:
The scheme involves four roles: the PKG, a trusted dealer, a sender group U A = {M 1, M 2 , . . . , M n }with identity ID A , and a receiver Bob with identity ID B . Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q (with G 1 additive and G 2 multiplicative), a generator P of G 1 , a bilinear mapê :
The PKG chooses a master-key s ∈ R Z * q and computes P pub = sP . The PKG publishes system parameters (G 1 , G 2 , n 1 , e, P, P pub , E, D, H 1 , H 2 f, H 3 ) and keeps the master-key s secret. Extract: Given an identity ID, the PKG computes Q ID = H 1 (ID) and the private key S ID = sQ ID . Then PKG sends the private key to its owner in a secure way. Keydis: Suppose that a threshold t and n satisfy 1≤t≤n < q. To share the private key S IDA among the group U A , the trusted dealer performs the steps below. 1) Choose F 1 , F 2 , ..., F t−1 uniformly at random from G * 1 and construct a polynomial F (x) = S IDA + xF 1 + . . .
4) Each M i then checks whether his share S i is valid by computingê(S
2) The clerk C (one among the t cooperating players) computes, 
If all partial signatures are verified to be legal, the clerk C computes W = t i=1 W i otherwise rejects it and requests a valid one.
6) The final threshold signcryption is σ = (c, R 1 , W ). Designcrypt: When receiving σ, Bob follows the steps below. 3 . We assume that A will ask for H 1 (ID) before ID is used in any key extraction, signcryption, and Designcryption queries. First, the adversary A outputs the identity ID A of the sender whose signcryption he claims to be able to forge. Then, the challenger C gives A the system parameters params, consisting of P, P pub = aP . The descriptions of the oracles is as follows: 
2. Else, C chooses x, h ∈ R Z * q . and computes R 1 = xP − hQ IDA , W = xP pub , and τ =ê(R 1 , S IDB ) (C could obtain S IDB from the key extraction algorithm because ID B = ID A ). C runs the H 2 simulation algorithm to find k = H 2 (τ ) and computes c = E k (m). C then checks if L 3 already contains a tuple (m, R 1 , k, h ) with h = h. In this case, C repeats the process with another random pair (x, h) until finding a tuple (m, R 1 , k, h) whose first three elements do not appear in a tuple of the list L 3 . Such a tuple, (m, 
So, we can see that the challenger C has the same advantage in solving the CDH problem as the adversary A has in forging a valid signcrypted ciphertext. So, if there exists an adversary who can forge a valid signcrypted ciphertext with non-negligible advantage, that means there exists an algorithm to solve the CDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can forge a valid signcrypted ciphertext with non-negligible advantage. Hence, the scheme is secure against any EUF-IDTSC attack.
Confidentiality Proof:
T heorem 2 : Our identity based threshold signcryption scheme is secure against any IND-IDTSC-CCA2 adversary A under the random oracle model if DBDHP is hard in G 1 . The proof of this theorem is available in the full version of the paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied an existing identity-based threshold signcryption scheme by Fagen Li [1] . They have proved the confidentiality of their scheme, but the unforgeability proof given by them is based on the underlying scheme's security which loses it's validity in the new scheme. We have shown a possible attack on their scheme where the clerk can obtain the secret key of the sender. Hence a total break of the system is possible. We have also proposed an improved scheme and we have proved its security formally in the existing security model for identity-based threshold signcryption schemes. We leave it as an open problem to investigate for more efficient schemes for identity-based threshold signcryption.
